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The paper investigates imperative sentence types in Hungarian focusing on 
the pragmasemantic contribution of discourse markers. It follows Lauer 
(2013) in assuming that – though illocutionary force varies widely – sentence 
types can be associated with conventions of use. The aim is to capture how 
the addition of extra elements can specify the domain defined by the general-
ized pragmasemantic representation of imperatives. For the analysis, the for-
mal dynamic discourse- and mind-representation theory ℜeALIS (Alberti & 
Kleiber 2014) is applied. The paper presents how the central component of 
imperatives can be captured with an intention-based axiom, and how the 
pragmasemantic description of the numerous uses – often signaled by dis-
course markers – can be generated by “monotonously increasing” the basic in-
tensional profile. This typically means the specification of the formula charac-
terizing the interlocutors’ desires behind the utterance, and/or adding elements 
representing authorities of various kinds. 
Key words: imperatives; discourse markers; pragmasemantic analysis; BDI 
states; authority. 
1. Introduction
The paper investigates imperative sentence types in Hungarian focusing on the 
pragmasemantic contribution of discourse markers. Imperatives in Hungarian as 
well as in other languages tend to be associated with a wide (and rather inhomoge-
neous) range of speech acts, such as command, warning, request, advice, permis-
sion, concession, etc. (Kaufmann (2012: 14): the functional inhomogeneity prob-
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lem). When the speaker utters a simple imperative sentence, one without discourse 
markers or special intonation, the interpreter can only rely on contextual factors to 
identify the speech act. The addition of extra elements, however, can narrow the 
possibilities. The main aim of this research is to provide a uniform pragmasemantic 
description for imperatives that can capture the essence of imperatives as well as 
the conditions of the various uses frequently signaled by discourse markers. 
As a starting point, this paper agrees with Lauer (2013) in supposing that there 
must exist some kind of conventionalized meaning for every sentence type. The 
imperative convention he formulates in his anti-representational Dynamic Pragmat-
ics states that “an utterance of an imperative conventionally commits the speaker to 
a preference for the imperative to become fulfilled” (Lauer 2013: 136). His obser-
vations are mostly in harmony with how imperatives are analyzed in our approach. 
It can be argued though that the framework of eliminative possible-world semantics 
he applies has some weak points theoretically (Pollard 2008) as well as practically 
(Alberti & Kleiber 2012). 
This paper intends to formalize the core meaning of imperatives in a representa-
tional framework. It also aims at generating the representations of the various uses 
of imperatives from the description of the core meaning in a monotone increasing 
way, and thus offering a more precise and thorough pragmasemantic analysis of 
imperatives. In the applied framework ℜeALIS (Alberti & Kleiber 2014), the inter-
locutors’ mental states are represented: the addresser’s beliefs, desires, and inten-
tions (BDIs) regarding the eventualities of the outside world, own mental states 
(BDIs) and those of others – typically the addressee –, as well as authorities. The 
paper demonstrates that the difference between the various speech acts can be cap-
tured by taking the relevant authority-related conditions into consideration on the 
one hand, and representing the interlocutors’ different desires on the other. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some basic concepts re-
garding the (pragma-)semantics of imperatives from the literature, and outlines 
Condoravdi & Lauer’s (2012) approach. The applied theoretical framework, 
ℜeALIS, is introduced briefly in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of 
the data. It describes the basic imperative intensional profile that captures the core 
meaning of imperatives. Then it elaborates on the pragmasemantic contribution of 
the different discourse markers: what extra axioms should be added to the main 
profile in order to generate the different shades of meaning. Finally, Section 5 
draws some conclusions. 
              
19.3 (2018): 365-391 
367
2. Theoretical background: the (pragma-)semantics of imperatives
In the literature (e.g. von Fintel & Iatridou 2017; Halm 2017), two main types of 
imperatives are differentiated. “Strong” imperatives express deontic necessity: they 
convey directive force and thus create obligations on the addressee to make the 
given eventuality true. Speech acts like command, request, advice, or plea belong 
to this type. In contrast, “weak” imperatives express deontic possibility, as they do 
not create obligations. The second type is constituted by permission statements: 
permission, acquiescence, or indifference. However, the classification of speech 
acts into the two main categories is not always evident; offer/invitation and (the 
types of) wish are probably the most controversial. 
To formally capture the meaning of imperatives in all its heterogeneity, numer-
ous accounts have been proposed. This paper only mentions a few, each following 
an anti-representational approach. Portner (2007) proposes the manipulation of the 
addressee’s To-do List (TDL), that is, a set of propositions he is committed to 
make true. As pointed out by Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) among others, this ap-
proach handles strong imperatives effectively, but it is problematic in the case of 
weak imperatives, and wish-type uses in particular. To fix this problem, Halm 
(2017) proposes the List of Actions Under Consideration (LAUC) which is to sub-
stitute the TDL in the case of weak imperatives. 
In von Fintel & Iatridou’s (2017) work, a modification is suggested to the TDL-
approach. They propose an analysis where uttering an imperative brings about a 
possible addition to the addressee’s TDL, and the choice between the various 
speech acts depends on the (varying) degree of speaker endorsement. In their ac-
count, an imperative (as well as a declarative or an interrogative) carries maximal 
speaker endorsement by default, which corresponds to the (necessary) addition to 
the addressee’s TDL. However, it is possible to utter a sentence with lower level of 
speaker endorsement, which is sometimes signaled by linguistic means (such as 
discourse markers), other times it is indicated only by contextual factors. They pro-
pose that acquiescence and indifference uses arise exactly when an utterance is 
made without speaker endorsement, thus the addressee is fully responsible to de-
cide whether to add the content to their TDL or not (von Fintel & Iatridou’s 2017: 
28). In contrast to their account, Halm (2017) argues for a binary distinction be-
tween strong and weak imperatives, and claims that the (gradual) degree of speaker 
endorsement only plays a role in the differentiation of the subtypes within the two 
main categories. It helps to separate, for instance, order and advice within strong 
imperatives, or permission and indifference within weak imperatives. 
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introduced in more detail. They point out that Portner’s (2007) account has difficul-
ty with several types of imperatives. The problem lies in that “the addressee of an 
imperative automatically becomes committed to making the content of the impera-
tive true” (Condoravdi & Lauer 2012: 55). They argue that this seems right for or-
der uses, but it is against intuition in the case of imperatives that express weaker di-
rective force such as requests or pleas, which do not (directly) create addressee ob-
ligations “(though they may be uttered in the hope that the addressee takes on a 
commitment)” (Condoravdi & Lauer 2012: 55). Non-directive uses (wish, permis-
sion, advice) are even more problematic. 
Some of these limitations could be overcome by applying one of the above men-
tioned modifications on Portner’s (2007) original account (von Fintel & Iatridou’s 
or Halm’s); addressee-less wish uses (e.g. ‘Please, don’t rain!’), on the other hand, 
still pose a problem for his approach. Therefore, Condoravdi & Lauer’s (2012) and 
Lauer’s (2013) imperative convention makes reference only to the addresser: 
“When a speaker utters an imperative that has the content ϕ, he thereby commits 
himself to prefer ϕ to be actualized” (Lauer 2013: 139). They argue that in order to 
account for all possible uses of imperatives, strong and weak types alike, their core 
meaning (uniform effect) cannot be more specific than this statement, and the vari-
ed uses of imperatives are to be derived by considering contextual (pragmatic) fac-
tors. “Imperatives do not create obligations as a matter of course by linguistic con-
vention, but give rise to obligations only indirectly when the context is right” 
(Condoravdi & Lauer 2012: 45). 
They divide the possible uses into four groups based on two main factors: ad-
dressee inducement and speaker desire. In this way, they differentiate between di-
rective, advice, wish-type and permission-type uses. Furthermore, the varied 
speech acts within each group can sometimes be subcategorized depending on a 
number of other contextual conditions. In what follows, first the relevant contextual 
factors are introduced, which Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) and Lauer (2013) rely 
on, then a table is presented (Table 1), which was created on the basis of their 
work, and enumerates several speech acts along with their contextual properties. 
The plus sign means that the given condition holds, while minus stands for the op-
posite. If both values are displayed, it indicates that they primarily argue for the 
first option, but somewhere in the paper(s) they seem to assume the second one in 
some weakened form. 
(1) Addressee inducement: if the imperative acts as an inducement for the ad-
dressee to bring about the content. The idea corresponds roughly to Portner’s 
(2007) addition to the addressee’s TDL; however, there is no obligation in the con-
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dition per se, it is only an attempt to get the addressee to do something, and the ob-
ligation may (or may not) arise in the context. 
(2) Speaker desire: if the imperative “conveys that the speaker wants the content
to become reality” (Condoravdi & Lauer 2012: 38). The speaker’s desire is a con-
troversial topic in the literature, the paper will elaborate on it in Section 4. 
(3) Addressee desire (preferences): if the addressee currently has interfering de-
sires (preferences) according to the speaker. It is not always clear though what they 
mean exactly by this condition; if it is about the addressee’s desire, preference, goal 
or intention – the paper will address this issue later in this section.  
(4) Addressee control: if the addressee has control about the content, meaning
that it will be realized if and only if the addressee would choose it. 
(5) Deontic authority: “the speaker believes himself to have deontic authority
over the addressee” (Lauer 2013: 144), i.e. the addressee must comply to the speak-
er. The question may arise that what is the addressee’s motivation for fulfilling the 
imperative if the speaker lacks deontic authority. He suggests that agents are sup-
posed to be generally cooperative-by-default, meaning that “if the action requested 
by a speaker does not ‘cost’ the addressee anything, i.e., if it does not interfere with 
his private preferences, he will act so as to fulfill the request” (Lauer 2012: 148). 
Table 1. Types of imperative and their contextual properties, based on Condoravdi & Lau-
















order + + – + + 
request + + not against + – 





+/– + + for g + – 








permission/offer –/+ – + + + 
concession –/+ against + + + 
Abbreviations used in the table (see 1–5 above): speaker (sp); addressee (ae), authority 
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As a summary of the discussion of Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) and Lauer 
(2013), attention is drawn to some problematic points. In order to overcome these 
limitations, this paper aims to offer an alternative account for the pragmasemantics 
of imperatives, which is intended to provide a more thorough analysis. 
Firstly, using anti-representational means may require cumbersome analysis. 
This paper argues that a representational approach can provide simpler solutions. 
Secondly, Lauer’s (2013) Dynamic Pragmatics disregards the epistemic precon-
dition of uttering an imperative, namely that the speaker assumes that the eventuali-
ty in question (the content of the imperative) does not hold, and also that the ad-
dressee is aware of this fact as well. For instance, telling someone to sit down is 
odd if the person is apparently sitting. 
Thirdly, numerous terms are introduced for the description of similar concepts, 
such as (effective/non-effective) preference, desire, endorsement, inducement, en-
ticement; and it is not always clear how the terms are related to each other and what 
they mean exactly in a particular setup (especially in the case of wish-type uses). 
This paper argues that the clear differentiation between intentions and desires can 
provide a more profitable solution, and the representation of the main three modali-
ties – beliefs, desires and intentions (BDI) – supplemented by a fourth one – au-
thority – can result in a more transparent description. 
Finally, their analysis of certain uses (e.g. advice) recognizes that the eventuality 
an imperative expresses can differ from the eventuality the interlocutors’ prefer-
ences actually refer to. However, it can be argued that this is a general phenome-
non, rather than restricted to only a few types. In the case of the imperative ‘Make 
me a sandwich (please)!’ for instance, it is reasonable to assume that the desire be-
hind the utterance concerns an eventuality about eating a sandwich instead of mak-
ing one. Obviously, these eventualities are connected, but the exact nature of the 
connection varies. This topic will be elaborated on in Section 4. 
3. Methodology: a brief introduction to ℜeALIS 
The applied theoretical framework ℜeALIS ‘Reciprocal And Lifelong Interpreta-
tion System’ (Alberti 2011) can be characterized as a discourse-representation-
based (Kamp et al. 2011; Asher & Lascarides 2003) formal semantic theory. It of-
fers a representational solution for numerous phenomena which turned out to be 
problematic for the anti-representational approach. It is argued that during a con-
versation the interlocutors’ goal is to gain information about each other’s minds at 
least as much as about the outside world. In the ℜeALIS framework, such stubborn 
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problems are accounted for as expressions with the same reference/meaning/truth 
value, accessibility of referents, modal anchoring and intensional identity. For more 
on this topic, see Alberti & Kleiber (2012). 
The basic argument against representationalism comes from the Amsterdam 
School (e.g. Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991) saying that it is theoretically problemat-
ic to add an extra level between the world model and the linguistic form. ℜeALIS 
eliminates this problem by reorganizing DRT via a radically new ontology (Alberti 
& Kleiber 2014). The innovative feature is that (all) representations are regarded as 
mental states – the interpreter’s beliefs (B), desires (D), and intentions (I) –, which 
are taken to be part of the world model. In this way, no “extra level” is postulated. 
Thus, the major benefit of representing the interlocutors’ minds on the basis of this 
new ontology is that it enables a more fine-grained analysis of linguistic phenome-
na – without these complex structures causing any conceptual problem. Another 
gain of referring to mental states is that ℜeALIS deals with similar questions as re-
searchers who have been studying the process of mentalization for several decades 
(Theory of Mind; e.g. Wimmer & Perner 1983). This connection defines a new 
field of research: to formalize cognitive/psychological issues (Alberti et al. 2016). 
In the framework of ℜeALIS, the evaluation process is based on a generalized 
version of the formal semantic operation pattern-matching. Since a homogeneous 
system is assumed for representing the discourse, the world, and the human mind, 
the same mechanism can be applied for extensional and intensional evaluation. In 
the process, the interlocutors’ momentary discrete mind states are to be mapped in-
to domains defined by the (linguistically encoded) intensional profiles of the rele-
vant sentence types. An intensional profile is to represent the pragmasemantic con-
tribution of a clause performed in a discourse: the interlocutors’ beliefs, desires, in-
tentions, and authority concerning the current piece of information. It consists of 
finite components of worldlets which minimally encode one meaning component 
each, such as a desire for an eventuality, or a belief about the intentions of the ad-
dressee. A worldlet can be regarded as a labeled DRS-like structure where eventu-
ality e is “inside” the box, and the label encodes the five essential properties which 
belong to e in this particular case (1). 
(1) The worldlet labels of ℜeALIS
M: Modality belief (B), desire (D), intention (I), authority (A) 
I: Intensity of M γ∈[0,1], where 1 corresponds to maximal, 0 to none 
R: host of the worldlet addresser (AR), addressee (ae), others (r, …) 
T: time parameter τ, τ– (< τ), τ+ (> τ), … 




   
Judit Kleiber: 
Similar intentions with different underlying wishes: Intensional profiles of 
imperatives in Hungarian 
For instance, if the sentence is I know that Peter loves Mary, then e=‘Peter loves 
Mary’, and the label encodes its status: AR knows (maximally believes) at time τ 
that the given eventuality e holds (+): 〈B,1,AR,τ,+〉. 
Every parameter can have multiple values, which allows underspecification in 
the representations. For instance, the intensity of a modality can vary within a 
range, or the polarity value may be “non-neutral” (+/–). Furthermore, a worldlet 
can be embedded in another worldlet which makes it possible to refer to infor-
mation states, resulting in recursively built worldlet-structures. For instance, the se-
ries of level labels 〈B,1,AR,τ,+〉〈D,1,ae,τ,+〉 assigned to a worldlet encodes that “I 
am sure that you long for it”. Finally, a key property of ℜeALIS is that a piece of 
information frequently appears in several worldlets simultaneously. When an even-
tuality e is represented in the interlocutor’s mind, it is “scattered” like a prism scat-
ters images multiplying a single image – this is why this phenomenon is called a 
prism effect. For instance, one can desire and also intend to do something (placing 
e in two worldlet boxes appropriately), while it might also happen that one comes 
to a decision concerning an intention in spite of their opposite desires (placing e in 
the negative segment of the worldlet of desire). Therefore, a set of finite sequences 
of level labels is assigned to an eventuality referent. Its mathematical definition en-
codes thus that an intensional profile is an element of the set 
P((P(M)×P(I)×P(R)×P(T)×P(P))*), where the power set of the set of finite se-
quences of level labels. The first power set symbol (bold P) captures the prism ef-
fect, the internal ones are responsible for underspecification, and the Kleene-star at 
the end enables recursion. 
As for the division of labor between semantics and pragmatics, in ℜeALIS 
meaning construction is divided as follows. Semantics is responsible for cumulat-
ing the propositional content from morpheme to morpheme. Pragmasemantics is to 
explore the conventionalized uses of the varied sentence types, and represent the 
information in the intensional profiles, which make reference to the (conventional-
ized) addresser and addressee roles. Finally, pragmatics examines the (mis)match 
between these roles and the mental states of the actual speaker and listener in a par-
ticular context. In harmony with Oishi’s (2014) thesis, it is to be evaluated from 
clause to clause whether the speaker is acting legitimately, sincerely, and/or ade-
quately, while, in the on-going discourse, playing the addresser’s role. With this 
approach, various pragmatic factors can be accounted for, such as the Gricean max-
ims (e.g., the sincerity or the relevance of an utterance), irony, politeness, etc. (For 
more on this matter, the interested reader is referred to Alberti et al. 2016). 
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Thus, the main objective of our research is very similar to that of Lauer’s 
(2013), namely, to specify the conventionalized meaning of sentence types (cf. 
Lauer’s declarative, imperative and interrogative convention), and then formalize 
the contribution of the relevant pragmatic factors in order to obtain the various us-
es. In this sense, ℜeALIS can be regarded as the representational counterpart of 
Lauer’s (2013) (anti-representational) Dynamic Pragmatics. The first step is to ex-
plore the different sentences types, and provide their pragmasemantic descriptions 
(intensional profiles). (For an overview of all the main types, see Alberti et al. 
(2016: Section 3). The analysis of interrogatives is discussed in Kleiber & Alberti 
(2014).) The difference between these profiles can be captured with only a few pa-
rameters, which makes the system suitable for computational implementation 
(Nőthig & Szeteli 2018). The next step is to achieve compositionality at the highest 
possible level: to derive increasingly more intensional profiles and/or profile ele-
ments from smaller parts using compositional processes. 
ℜeALIS applies several means for providing compositional analysis, operations 
defined on intensional profiles: The union and/or specification of profile elements 
to simply put together compatible parts, and thus create modified intentional pro-
files. Concatenation, which is suitable for deriving the profiles of mixed-type sen-
tences, such as interrogative imperatives, i.e. questions targeted at commands 
(Kleiber & Alberti 2017). The formal operation of semantic blending (based on the 
cognitive linguistic notion), which is capable of mixing partially incompatible 
meaning components, such as mood and modality (Alberti et al. 2014). Finally, 
function composition and the process of addressee-accommodation to derive more 
complex sentence types from simpler ones: declarative, imperative, and interroga-
tive from exclamative, optative, and vajon-interrogative ’I wonder’, respectively 
(Kárpáti & Szeteli 2018). 
The present paper contributes to this task by proposing a compositional analysis 
of imperatives. It provides a basic, partially underspecified profile, and formalizes 
the pragmasemantic contribution of various discourse markers in a way that the 
specified profiles are calculable via combining the given profile elements using un-
ion and specification. It is important to note that while some discourse markers can 
be assigned close to uniform meanings throughout the various uses, most of them 
have a much more complex contribution. For instance, hát ‘well’ can indicate many 
speaker attitudes (e.g. uncertainty, certainty, emphasis, consequence) depending on 
sentence type, stress pattern, and context. Therefore, their pragmasemantic descrip-
tions should be context-dependent or extremely underspecified. This paper follows 




Similar intentions with different underlying wishes: Intensional profiles of 
imperatives in Hungarian 
4. Results: the intensional profiles of various types of imperatives
in Hungarian
This section proposes a pragmasemantic analysis for imperatives in the representa-
tional framework ℜeALIS. Several types of Hungarian imperative sentences are 
introduced that differ in discourse markers. It is argued that (1) the conventional-
ized meaning of imperatives can be described with the basic imperative intensional 
profile (Section 4.1), which belongs to the basic (discourse marker-free) type of 
imperative sentence; and (2) the contribution of various discourse markers – signal-
ing different uses – can be captured by “monotonously increasing” this basic pro-
file (Section 4.2). Since the paper mainly focuses on the interlocutors’ desires, it 
presents the sentence types starting from the ones expressing strong self-interest 
toward the ones indicating more and more cooperative behavior. 
4.1. Basic profile 
In the ℜeALIS approach, the pragmasemantic contribution of any sentence type is 
expressed by referring to the interlocutors’ beliefs, desires, intentions, and authori-
ties concerning the eventuality in question. For the basic imperative, i.e., the one 
without extra elements (2), this piece of information is encoded in the basic imper-
ative intensional profile.  
(2) Ül-j le!   command/request/permission/etc. 
sit-SBJV1.2SG down 
‘Sit down!’ 
It is argued that there are three relevant components that constitute the basic pro-
file, i.e. express the core meaning of imperatives: two axioms that represent the in-
terlocutors’ beliefs, one (central) axiom for intentions, and an underspecified for-
mula describing desires. It is argued that the need for authority-related axioms 
emerges only in particular contexts, thus they are not part of the conventionalized 
profile of imperatives. 
The first component of the basic profile concerns the interlocutors’ beliefs and 
can be regarded as an epistemic precondition for the imperative to act as a felici-
tous utterance (3). It expresses that the addresser (AR, sometimes referred to as ‘I’) 
assumes that the given eventuality (the content of the imperative) does not hold, 
and also that the addressee (ae, sometimes referred to as ‘you’) is aware of this fact 
1 In harmony with Varga (2013), we assume that, due to their full paradigms, imperatives in Hunga-
rian are in the subjunctive mood. 
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as well. For instance, telling someone to eat their soup is odd if the person’s plate is 
empty. (It does not mean, however, that under no circumstance an imperative like 
this can be uttered, but then this utterance will fall outside the conventionalized use 
of imperatives.) 
(3) 〈B,1,AR,τ,–〉; 〈B,γ,AR,τ,+〉〈B,1,ae,τ,–〉, where preferably γ=1
‘I know that e does not hold; and assume that you also know that.’
The central component of the basic imperative profile expresses that AR’s inten-
tion is to achieve eventuality e through influencing ae’s intention to make e happen 
(4). This means that in ℜeALIS, it is the speaker who takes on a commitment, 
similarly to Lauer’s (2013) imperative convention.  
(4) 〈I,1,AR,τ,+〉〈I,1,ae,τ+,+〉
‘I want you to intend (at a later time τ+) that e be realized.’
As for the interlocutors’ desires, it is argued that the precise values are unspeci-
fied in the case of the basic imperative, since in some uses it is not AR but ae who 
longs for e. The formula in (5) describes this observation. It expresses that some 
kind of positive desire has to be behind uttering an imperative. The host of this de-
sire (r*) is typically AR, often ae, and occasionally someone else. The point is that 
– according to AR – the summed intensity of their desire ≥1 (Szeteli 2017).
(5) 〈B,γ,AR,τ,+〉〈D,γr*,r*,τ,+〉; where Σγx ≥1 (x∈r*), and preferably r*={AR,ae}
‘I assume that someone (I, you, maybe someone else) wishes for e to be ful-
filled.’
This is a general formula which is also a part of the declarative and the interrog-
ative profile. It can capture the fact that it is not ab ovo decided whether AR is led 
by self-interest or cooperation while performing either a declarative, or an interrog-
ative, or even an imperative. In the present discussion, the formula can account for 
the observation that behind uttering various types of imperatives – while the inten-
tions are rather similar – the desires can be very different: AR can act on self-
interest (γAR=1), inclination for cooperation (γae=1), the assumption of a third par-
ty’s interest (γr=1; r≠AR,ae), or some kind of combination of the above. 
As for the distinction between desire and intention, Mann (2003) differentiates 
between intended actions and intended effects, and argues that “(i)ntended effects 
typically are states of affairs that the intender desires or prefers, while intended ac-
tions typically involve some identifiable process within the capacities of the ac-
tor(s)” (Mann 2003: 170). Thus, ‘intended effects’ are called desires in ℜeALIS. It 
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2012) in the case of intentions, but not (necessarily) in the case of desires. 
It can also be observed that sometimes the eventuality the interlocutors intend 
(e) differs from the one their desires actually relate to (e’). The connection between 
e and e’ varies. They can refer to different eventualities that are associated in some 
way, such as making a sandwich and eating one, or taking the medicine and getting 
better. They can refer to different phases of the same eventuality, for instance the 
cumulative phase (‘Stand up!’) and the result phase (‘be standing’). For the sake of 
uniformity, it is reasonable to assume different e and e’ in general, allowing that 
e=e’. As for the connection between the associated eventualities, it is to be calcu-
lated on the basis of a supposed network of predicates, to be more precise, of its 
cognitive counterpart in the interlocutors’ minds. This network consists of lexical 
information and logical implications, but also of practical and cultural knowledge, 
i.e. “saved” segments of past eventualities – due to the ‘lifelong’ nature of ℜeALIS 
(Kleiber & Alberti 2014). 
4.2. Specified profiles 
This section elaborates on the pragmasemantic contribution of different discourse 
markers: compared to the basic profile, what specifications and/or extra axioms are 
needed in order to generate the different shades of meaning. 
To account for the various uses that the addition of extra elements indicate, the 
different contextual conditions should be taken into consideration. In the frame-
work of ℜeALIS, these conditions can be represented by two kinds of modification 
on the basic profile. On the one hand, the specification of the general formula in (5) 
describing the interlocutors’ desires, which can reveal that it is AR or ae (or per-
haps someone else) who longs for the fulfillment of e. On the other hand, the addi-
tion of different authority-related conditions, which can capture deontic authority, 
and addressee’s control (cf. Table 1). (In ℜeALIS, having authority over something 
includes both right, and ability.) 
Before turning to the contribution of discourse markers, a different kind of spe-
cialized profile is mentioned. Hungarian is different from English in that an im-
perative sentence can appear in any person and number (cf. Footnote 1). When the 
third person is used, AR calls on ae to influence a third person to do something. 
Consider (6), for instance (one parent to the other). 
(6) Vegye be (a gyerek) a vitamin-t! 
 take.SBJV.3SG in  the kid the vitamin-ACC 
‘The kid should take his vitamin!’ 
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This usage does not realize the most typical case for imperatives, the one where 
Ag=ae (2nd person verb forms). There is a contextual precondition in place, namely 
that AR considers ae to have influence over the agent (i.e. the parent over the 
child). In this case, an extra axiom is added to the basic profile encoding that – in 
AR’s assumption – ae has authority over the intentions of this other person r (7). 
(7) 〈B,γ,AR,τ,+〉〈A,1,ae,τ,+〉〈I,1,r,τ+,+〉, where r=Ag (the agent of e)
‘I assume that you have authority over r’s intentions regarding e.’
somewhat simplified: ‘I assume that you can tell r to do e.’
The addition of various discourse markers can specify the situation narrowing 
the possible speech acts. In what follows, the role of these elements are discussed 
in three groups: (A) directive, expressing self-interest; (B) directive, indicating co-
operation; and (C) non-directive, cooperative. At the end of the section, wish-type 
uses are also analyzed – as a fourth group (D) expressing non-directive use with 
self-interest –, despite that wishes are not signaled by discourse markers.  
(A) The first group of discourse markers includes azonnal ‘at once’ (8); nekem
‘to me’ (cf. Varga 2013) (9); a special, lengthened (“whining”) intonation (10); and 
the expression légy szíves ‘please’ with a normal intonation (11). They all indicate 
strong self-interest: AR really wants eventuality e to happen, that is, AR’s inten-
tions and desires are both positive toward the fulfillment of e. As for AR’s supposi-
tions about ae’s information state: in the case of (8–10), AR is fairly sure that ae is 
against (or not interested in) the fulfillment of e. Discourse markers azonnal (8) 
and nekem (9) indicate a kind of command, while the special intonation in (10) in-
dicates entreaty or plea (note that nekem does not act as a discourse marker in 10). 
With légy szíves ‘please’ (11), AR supposes that ae is not against e, and hopes to 
make ae wish for the fulfillment of e at least a little (for AR’s sake). Thus, we get 
the speech act of request (in its form; it can still be meant as a command though). 
(8) Azonnal  gyere     ide! command 
at_once  come.SBJV.2SG  here 
‘Come here at once!’ 
(9) Tedd le nekem (az-t) a telefon-t!     command/threat 
put.SBJV.2SG down DAT.1SG  that-ACC the phone-ACC 
‘Hang up the phone (for me)!’  
(10) Vegyél nekem fagyiii-t (légyszi-légyszi)!            plea 
buy.SBJV.2SG DAT.1SG ice_cream-ACC (pretty please) 
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(11) Gyere ide, légy szíves! request 
come.SBJV.2SG here please 
‘Come here, please!’ 
In order to represent that the addition of all these elements to a basic imperative 
indicates self-interest, the basic imperative intensional profile is specified so as 
γAR=1 in the formula (5) above. Another common condition, due to the directive 
nature of this type, is that AR assumes that ae is able to carry out the action, i.e., 
has authority over e (12). 
(12) 〈B,γ,AR,τ,+〉〈A,1,ae,τ,+〉 
‘I assume that you have authority over e / you can do e.’ 
The difference between these uses can be captured via two conditions. On the 
one hand, when the imperative contains azonnal (8) or nekem (9), another authority 
axiom (13) is added to the profile, which represents that AR believes to have au-
thority over ae’s intentions regarding e (which roughly corresponds to Lauer’s 
(2013) deontic authority). This condition is present for all command-type utteranc-
es for that matter. It is not present, however, in the case of plea and request (or any 
other type). 
(13) 〈B,γ,AR,τ,+〉〈A,1,AR,τ,+〉〈I,1,ae,τ+,+〉 
‘I assume that I have authority over your intentions about e / I can tell you 
to do e.’ 
On the other hand, when the imperative contains the special intonation accom-
panying plea (10), AR assumes that ae is against the fulfillment of e. So another 
dimension is taken into consideration: the opposing stance, that is, the interlocu-
tors’ negative desire toward e. In this case, (14) is added to the profile. 
(14) 〈B,γ,AR,τ,+〉〈D,γ’,ae,τ,–〉 
‘I assume that you have negative desire for e.’ 
In the case of commands with azonnal or nekem, this opposition is also present, 
but not (necessarily) in plain commands, and neither in requests. On the contrary, 
for requests it is presupposed that ae is not against the fulfillment of e (15). 
(15) 〈B,γ,AR,τ,–〉〈D,γ’,ae,τ,–〉 
‘I assume that you do not have negative desire for e.’ 
As for compositionality, the specialized profiles can be constructed by using the 
union operation (since the meaning components are compatible), i.e. putting to-
gether the profile elements of the basic imperative (3–5) with the ones presented in 
(12–15), and specifying the formula in (5). 
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Table 2 summarizes the modifications discussed above. It shows that two axi-
oms are present in all cases, while the other two axioms differentiate between the 
uses.  
Table 2. Specialized profiles of imperatives, group (A): self-interest 
Group (A): self-interest 













azonnal ‘at once’, 
nekem ‘to me’ (command) 
γAR=1 + + + 
lengthened intonation (plea) γAR=1 + – + 
légy szíves ‘please’ (request) γAR=1 + – – 
(commands without extra elements) γAR=1 + + – 
(B) The second group collects such directive uses when AR cooperates: the ful-
fillment of e is (supposedly) ae’s wish. So the formula in (5) is specified as γae=1. 
The particles csak ‘just’ (16), and már ‘already’ (17) belong to this group, as well 
as the speech act of advice which is sometimes signaled by hát ‘well’ (18). The 
discourse markers csak and már can express several speaker attitudes even by look-
ing at imperatives only: threatening, hastening, encouraging (Fábricz 1986: 78). In 
(16), csak can signal encouragement or threat depending on the stress pattern 
(Gyuris 2008: 644) or other contextual factors. In (17), már expresses hastening. In 
both cases, the presence of these elements (still) indicates a directive use, but sug-
gests that, this time, ae’s (supposed) wish is on the table.  
(16) Vedd csak meg az-t az autó-t!           encouragement / threat 
buy.SBJV.2SG just PERF that-ACC the car-ACC 
‘Just buy that car!’ 
(17) Hív-d már el Mari-t randi-ra!   hastening 
call-SBJV.2SG already PERF Mari-ACC date-SUB 
‘Ask Mari out already!’ 
The particle hát ‘well’ is one of the most commonly used and also the most het-
erogeneous discourse marker in Hungarian (Kiefer 1988; Alberti 2016). When add-
ed to an imperative (18), hát expresses a kind of consequence, a logical response to 
the preceding discourse and/or the context, and it can usually be substituted or sup-
plemented by akkor ‘then’ (which is in harmony with its diachronically changing 
meaning; Schirm 2011). This type of imperative mostly conveys the speech act of 
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presence of extra elements.) In our view, advice is still regarded as a directive, 
though undoubtedly one with a weaker force. The reason could be that the interloc-
utors’ desires for eventuality e do not play a part this time; with this utterance, AR 
merely suggests a logical choice of action. Nevertheless, there seem to be a desire 
in the background, namely ae’s wish for an eventuality e’ related to e. 
(18) Hát (akkor) keres-s másik orvos-t! advice 
well (then) look_for-SBJV.2SG another doctor-ACC 
‘Find another doctor then!’ 
The common element in all these uses is ae’s authority over e (12), due to the di-
rective nature of these types. As for further refinement regarding the interlocutors’ 
desires, when csak is used in a threatening tone AR is definitely against e (19).  
(19) 〈D,γ,AR,τ,–〉 
‘I am against e.’ 
In the case of advice, two types are differentiated in the literature: advice with a 
shared goal, and disinterested advice (cf. Condoravdi & Lauer 2012). In ℜeALIS, 
the difference can be captured by referring to AR’s desire. When there is a com-
mon goal, for instance at the doctor’s (20), AR also wishes for e’. In this case, the 
formula in (5) is realized as an actual summation where γAR is also positive.  
(20) Take these pills!
To find the appropriate associated e’ the interlocutors’ desire refers to, the above
mentioned mental network is employed. In (20), while AR’s intention (e) is to take 
the pills, the common desire (e’) is for ae to recover. In ℜeALIS though, it is not 
necessary for e’ to be the same for AR and ae (it does not have to be a common 
goal). As Lauer (2013) points out, the doctor’s motivation could be to make extra 
money (ignoring ae’s desire), in which case AR’s goal behind the utterance is dif-
ferent from ae’s. Furthermore, the doctor’s e’ can also be constructed from the con-
junction of curing the patient and making extra money. Similarly, the patient’s e’ 
can be composed from ‘getting better’ and ‘not spending too much money’. 
(C) In the third group, the contribution of such elements are discussed as
nyugodtan ‘feel free to’ (Halm 2017) (21), another lengthened stress pattern (22), 
and the hortative marker hadd ‘let’ (analyzed later on). When they are added to an 
imperative, it is clear that AR does not want e to be fulfilled for “selfish” reasons, 
but rather this utterance is made on ae’s (or a third party’s) behalf. The result is dif-
ferent types of permission statement: permission, concession, acquiescence, or in-
difference (von Fintel & Iatridou 2017). The discourse marker nyugodtan indicates 
permission, while the intonation pattern in (22) signals concession. 
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(21) Nyugodtan vedd el az utolsó süti-t! permission 
calmly take.SBJV.2SG away the last cookie-ACC 
‘Feel free to take the last cookie!’ 
(22) Küüüld-jél neki valami-t! concession 
send-SBJV.2SG DAT.3SG something-ACC
‘Fine, send her something.’
All of these discourse markers indicate a non-directive, cooperative use, when 
the fulfillment of e is ae’s (or a third party’s) desire, and the purpose of the utter-
ance is to grant authority. In the first two cases (2nd person verb forms), e is ae’s 
wish, so the formula in (5) is specified as γae=1. Furthermore, the following au-
thority-related preconditions are added to the profile: (23a), or a more cautious 
(23b), and (24).  
(23a) 〈B,γ,AR,τ,–〉〈A,1,ae,τ,+〉 
‘I assume that you do not have authority over e / you are not allowed to do 
e.’ 
(23b) 〈B,γ,AR,τ,+〉〈B,γ’,ae,τ,–〉〈A,1,ae,τ,+〉 
‘I assume that you believe that you do not have authority over e.’ 
(24) 〈I,1,AR,τ,+〉〈A,1,ae,τ+,+〉
‘My intention is that you have authority over e / you may do e.’
So the intentions are modified with this type: the basic imperative intention (4) 
is backgrounded, since a major condition is missing, namely, ae’s authority over e. 
Thus, the main intention of a permission-type imperative will be to grant authority 
to ae. This solution is in harmony with the literature. For instance, Portner (2007: 
357) speculates that in the case of permissions, “it is presupposed that the speaker
has the authority to prohibit the act in question”. Halm (2017: 2) argues that the ef-
fect of weak imperatives “is the lifting of any prohibition that the addressee may
have ascribed to the speaker with regard to the action described in the prejacent”.
Finally, Lauer (2013: 147) supposes that “permission for p can be viewed as the re-
traction or modification of the permitter’s existing preferential commitment for
¬p”, i.e., “remove the prohibition against p”.
The difference between permissions and concessions can be captured (again) by 
taking the interlocutors’ negative desires into consideration. In the case of conces-
sions expressed by this lengthened intonation pattern (22), AR’s desire is clearly 
negative toward the fulfillment of e, so (19) is added to the profile. Still, despite 
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doravdi & Lauer’s (2012) analysis rests on the same observation: “The use of the 
imperative indicates that the speaker’s (limited) endorsement of the content now 
overrides his desire to the contrary” (Condoravdi & Lauer 2012: 43). In Hungarian, 
similarly to their English examples, such continuations are infelicitous when AR 
expresses negative intention (with akar ‘want’), but felicitous when AR expresses 
negative desire (with szeretne ‘would like’ or bárcsak ‘wish’) (25a–b).  
(25a) Küüüld-jél neki valami-t! 
send.SBJV.2SG DAT.3SG something-ACC 
#De én az-t  akar-om, hogy ne küld-j! 
but I that-ACC want-1SG that don’t send-SBJV.2SG 
‘Fine, you can send her something. But I don’t want you to.’ 
(25b) De én az-t  szeretné-m, ha nem küld-ené-l! 
but I that-ACC would_like-1SG if not send-COND-2SG 
/ De bárcsak ne küld-ené-l! 
/ but I_wish don’t send-COND-2SG 
‘But I wouldn’t like you to. / But I wish you would not.’ 
As mentioned earlier, the hortative marker hadd ‘let’ (26) can express permis-
sion, acquiescence, or indifference depending on the context. The possible continu-
ations can differentiate between the uses. Note that hadd can also express asking 
for permission (Szücs 2010), in which case the verb can be in the first and third 
person, while in the case of granting permission, only the third person is possible. 
(26) Hadd kiabál-jon!    permission / acquiescence / indifference 
let shout-SBJV.3SG 
‘He can shout.’ (I allow it. / It doesn’t bother me. / I don’t care.) (also: ‘Let 
him shout.’) 
The intensional profile of the permission-granting type of hadd is very similar to 
that of other permission uses (nyugodtan-type); the difference derives from the 
verb being in the third person. In this case, it is not ae but this third person r (the 
agent) who longs for the fulfillment of e, so the formula in (5) is specified as γr=1, 
where r≠AR, or ae. Furthermore, the authority-related extra axioms (23a) and (24) 
are added to the profile in their generalized forms (23a’) and (24’), respectively. In 
the original account of imperatives, every condition is formulated in a form that 
captures the pragmasemantic contribution of second and third person verb forms 
alike (see e.g. Kleiber et al. 2016). 
(23a’) 〈B,γ,AR,τ,–〉〈A,1,r,τ,+〉 
‘I assume that r does not have authority over e / r is not allowed to do e.’ 
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(24’) 〈I,1,AR,τ,+〉〈A,1,r,τ+,+〉 
‘My intention is that r have authority over e / r may do e.’ 
There is no agreement on how to analyze offers (invitations). For instance, Con-
doravdi & Lauer (2012) and Lauer (2013) regard this type as a permission state-
ment, while Halm (2017) categorizes it as a “weakly endorsed strong imperative”. 
In ℜeALIS, it does not have to be one or the other. The intensional profile of offers 
simply contains both intentions: the basic one (4), and the permission-granting one 
(24). As for the interlocutors’ desires, it is argued that the formula in (5) is speci-
fied as an actual summation this time, since an offer usually indicates that both AR 
and ae wishes for the fulfillment of e. So γAR and γae are both positive yielding a ≥1 
value; and the further specification depends on contextual factors. It can be argued 
though that in the case of offers, AR not really assumes, but rather hopes (wishes) 
that ae realize e, for instance, take a cookie AR baked. 
(D) Although wish-type uses are not signaled by discourse markers in Hungari-
an, they are discussed briefly for the sake of symmetry, since they realize the non-
directive, non-cooperative type of imperatives. Consider the examples (27–30), 
which are the translations of Condoravdi & Lauer’s (2012: 39) original examples. 
(27) Gyógyul-j meg hamar! well-wish 
heal-SBJV.2SG PERF. soon 
‘Get well soon!’ 
(28) Dögöl-j meg! ill-wish (curse) 
die(rude)-SBJV.2SG PERF. 
‘Drop dead!’ 
(29) Ne essen az eső! addressee-less wish 
don’t fall.SBJV.3SG the rain 
‘Don’t rain!’ 
(30) Legyen/legyél szőke! [on the way to a blind date] absent wish 
be.SBJV.3SG/2SG blond 
‘Be blond!’ 
In these cases, the fulfillment of e is AR’s wish: γAR=1. Curses (28) are different 
in that AR does not typically wish for e per se, but instead a more general e’ ex-
pressing ‘something bad’. They are often idiomatic; for instance, instead of (28), 
the non-rude verb meghal ‘die’ cannot be used (while meant it as a curse). The 
main difference between well- and ill-wish is that AR supposes that ae’s desire is 
positive toward the first one, while negative toward the second one. As for inten-
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(23a), and thus the basic intention in (4) cannot be satisfied. And in the case of ad-
dressee-less and absent wish (29–30), there is no actual addressee, which makes the 
basic intention in (4) meaningless. Therefore (4) – and also the second part of (3) – 
become subject to a contextually triggered deletion, resulting in the optative inten-
sional profile, and thus merely expressing AR’s desire (31) (Alberti et al. 2016). 
(31) 〈B,1,AR,τ,–〉; 〈D,1,AR,τ,+〉 
‘I know that e does not hold, and I wish for e to be fulfilled.’ 
As a summary of all the specialized profiles, the relevant contextual conditions 
are presented in a table (Table 3): how the formula for desires in (5) is specified, 
and what extra axioms are added to the basic profile in order to capture the prag-
masemantic contribution of the various discourse markers. The relevant axioms are 
repeated below for the ease of reading. 
(32a) 〈B,1,AR,τ,–〉  
‘I know that e does not hold.’ 
(32b) 〈B,γ,AR,τ,+〉〈B,1,ae,τ,–〉  
‘I assume that you also know that e does not hold.’ 
(33) 〈I,1,AR,τ,+〉〈I,1,ae,τ+,+〉 
‘I want you to intend (at a later time τ+) that e be realized.’ 
(34) 〈B,γ,AR,τ,+〉〈D,γr*,r*,τ,+〉; where Σγx ≥1 (x∈r*), and preferably 
r*={AR,ae} 
‘I assume that someone (I, you, maybe someone else) wishes for e to be 
fulfilled.’ 
(35) 〈B,γ,AR,τ,+〉〈A,1,ae,τ,+〉  
‘I assume that you have authority over e / you can do e.’ 
(36) 〈B,γ,AR,τ,+〉〈A,1,AR,τ,+〉〈I,1,ae,τ+,+〉 
‘I assume that I have authority over your intentions about e / I can tell you 
to do e.’ 
(37) (〈B,γ,AR,τ,+〉)〈D,γ’,r,τ,–〉 
‘(I assume that) someone has negative desire for e.’ 
(38) 〈B,γ,AR,τ,–〉〈A,1,ae,τ,+〉  
‘I assume you do not have authority over e / you are not allowed to do e.’ 
(39) 〈I,1,AR,τ,+〉〈A,1,ae,τ+,+〉 
‘My intention is that you have authority over e / you may do e.’ 
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légy szíves 
request + + + – γAR=1 + – – 
–
commands + + + – γAR=1 + + – 
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+ + (+) + γae=1 – – – 
– 
offer + + + + 
γae>0.5 
γAR>0.5 – – – 
(D) 
well/ill-
wish + + – – γAR=1 – – –/r=ae 
ae-less/ ab-
sent w. + 0 0 0 γAR=1 0 0 – 
4.3. Four challenges of imperatives 
Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) introduces four challenges that a theory of imperatives 
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of ℜeALIS. 
1. Contextual inconsistency means that “different utterances of imperatives 
(from the same speaker, towards the same addressee) must be consistent (and hence 
contradicting utterances must be interpreted as revisions)” (Condoravdi & Lauer 
2012: 41). On the other hand, it is not inconsistent to have contradicting desires. 
Consider (40a–b). 
(40a) #Go, and stay! / #My intention is that you go, and that you stay. 
(40b) I wish you would go (so you do not get into trouble), but I also wish you 
would stay (so we could spend a little more time together). 
In ℜeALIS, a given worldlet with the modality label of Intention needs to be 
consistent (with a given time stamp), since AR cannot be in the preparatory phase 
of e and ¬e at the same time. However, a worldlet with the modality label Desire 
can contain various kinds of wishes; one can even long for incompatible eventuali-
ties at the same time (with the same or with a different degree of intensity). There 
is no conflict, because desires are not necessarily acted on. 
2. Speaker endorsement means that “(a) speaker who utters an imperative with 
content p cannot, without being subject to blame, act so as to prevent the realization 
of p” (Lauer 2013: 142). This requirement excludes a continuation like “but I do 
not want you to”, meaning that the speaker has to endorse the action. On the other 
hand, a continuation like “but I wish you would not” is felicitous, indicating that 
the speaker can have, and can even express, an opposite desire. In ℜeALIS, en-
dorsement corresponds to intention, and since uttering an imperative always com-
mits AR to the intention toward the realization of e (33), AR necessarily endorses 
the action. It is possible, however, to have a desire that is in opposition of this in-
tention, which was demonstrated in Section 4.2 for concessions.  
3. Automatic sincerity means that “(t)he speaker of an imperative cannot be tak-
en to be insincere with respect to the desire he communicates with an imperative” 
(Condoravdi & Lauer 2012: 43). This condition excludes reactions like (41a), while 
the same reaction is fine, when a declarative is uttered instead of an imperative 
(41b). 
(41a) A: Go home! B: #You are lying, you don’t really want me to go home. 
(41b) A: I want you to go home. B: You are lying, you don’t really want me to 
go home. 
The difference can be explained by pointing out that the word lying is only used 
in connection with declaratives. However, this does not mean that an imperative 
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cannot be insincere. Consider (41c), for instance, which can constitute as a felici-
tous dialogue. 
(41c) A: Go home! B: Don’t act like you want me to leave! I know that you need 
me here. 
It is true, though, that an imperative conveys that AR’s intention (and sometimes 
desire) is that e becomes fulfilled; however, the actual speaker’s intentions and de-
sires can be different. This issue is addressed in the pragmatics along with other po-
tential mismatches between the content of the conventionalized intentional profiles 
and the actual speech situation (Section 3). 
4. Interlocutors’ role in acting on the imperative states that the speaker’s in-
volvement is limited in the realization of the content, and “if, but only if, there is a 
volitional addressee and he has influence on the realization of the content, the pri-
mary responsibility for realizing the content lies with him” (Condoravdi & Lauer 
2012: 44). In other words, an imperative is agentive for the addressee, except for 
wish-uses. This condition excludes that an imperative be a promise, for instance. In 
ℜeALIS, the basic intention (33) encodes that it is the addressee whose responsibil-
ity is the realization of the content, while in the case of wish-uses, this axiom is de-
leted due to either the lack of authority (no “influence”), or the lack of addressee. 
This contextually triggered deletion results in the reinterpretation of the imperative 
as an optative. 
5. Conclusions
The paper introduced an account for the pragmasemantics of imperatives in a rep-
resentational interpretation system, ℜeALIS. Imperatives can convey a wide range 
of speech acts, such as command, request, advice, permission, concession, etc. 
When a simple imperative is uttered, the interpreter can only rely on contextual fac-
tors to identify the speech act. In Hungarian, the addition of various discourse 
markers to a simple imperative sentence can narrow the possibilities. The aim of 
the paper was to provide an analysis able to capture the conventionalized (core) 
meaning of imperatives, as well as the contribution of the various discourse mark-
ers signaling different uses. 
In the ℜeALIS approach, the interlocutors’ mental states are represented – as a 
part of the world model –: beliefs, desires, intentions and authorities. The core 
meaning of imperatives is encoded in the basic imperative intensional profile. It 
was argued that there are three components that constitute the basic profile. (1) 
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does not hold. (2) One central axiom for intentions, which can capture the impera-
tive convention (Lauer 2013) saying that the addresser’s (AR) intention is to get the 
addressee (ae) to intend the eventuality in question (e). And (3) an underspecified 
formula for the representation of desires, which can capture the fact that AR can act 
on self-interest (γAR=1), cooperation (γae=1), assumption of a third party’s interest 
(γr=1; r≠AR,ae), or a combination of the above (actual summation). 
After describing the basic profile for imperatives, the paper demonstrated how 
the addition of various discourse markers can lead to specialized profiles by taking 
into consideration the different contextual conditions these elements introduce. 
These specialized profiles were created via monotone increasing modifications on 
the basic profile. This typically involved the specification of the formula character-
izing the interlocutors’ desires, and/or the addition of axioms representing authori-
ties of various kinds, such as AR’s authority over ae’s intentions, or ae’s authority 
over e. Based on these conditions, four groups of imperatives were discussed: (A) 
directive, expressing self-interest; (B) directive, indicating cooperation; (C) non-
directive, cooperative; and (D) non-directive with self-interest. 
In addition to categorizing the various uses based primarily on the interlocutors’ 
desires and authorities, the analysis revealed that AR’s main intention behind utter-
ing an imperative can be twofold: to get ae to carry out e, and to grant authority to 
ae to carry out e. The second type of intention emerges in the case of permission 
statements (C), when the basic intention gets backgrounded, due to the (assumed) 
lack of addressee-authority. 
There has been a debate in the literature about whether the distinction between 
the types of imperative should be binary (e.g. Halm 2017) or “graded” (e.g. von 
Fintel & Iatridou 2017). In the light of this research, the answer could be: both. The 
main distinction between strong and weak imperatives can be captured by the two 
main intentions, while the various desires – represented by the underspecified for-
mula of the basic imperative profile – can correspond to the gradual scale of speak-
er endorsement, which can be made explicit by adding extra elements to a simple 
imperative. 
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GLEICHE INTENTIONEN MIT UNTERSCHIEDLICHEN WÜNSCHEN IM HINTER-
GRUND: INTENSIONALES PROFIL DES IMPERATIVS IM UNGARISCHEN 
Diese Arbeit untersucht Aufforderungssätze im Ungarischen insbesondere im Zusammen-
hang mit dem pragmasemantischen Beitrag der Diskursmarker. Der Ausgangspunkt ist 
Lauers Annahme (2013), dass – wegen der Vielfalt von illokutiven Kräften – den Satzty-
pen Verwendungskonventionen zugeordnet werden können. Das Ziel ist zu erfassen, wie 
diese zusätzlichen Elemente der verallgemeinerten pragmasemantischen Repräsentation 
der Imperativsätze eine spezifischere Bedeutung hinzufügen können. Bei der Analyse wur-
de die formale, dynamische Diskurs- und mentale Repräsentationstheorie ℜeALIS (Alberti 
& Kleiber, 2014) angewendet. Die zentrale Komponente der Imperativsätze wird durch ein 
auf der Intention basierendes Axiom erfasst. Die pragmasemantischen Beschreibungen der 
verschiedenen Verwendungen – die oft durch Diskursmarker signalisiert werden – können 
durch monotone Erweiterung des intensionalen Profils erzeugt werden. Das bedeutet typi-
scherweise die Spezifizierung der Formel, die auf die Wünsche der Diskursteilneh-
mer/innen verweist, und/oder die Angabe von zusätzlichen Elementen, die verschiedene 
Autoritäten repräsentieren. 
Stichwörter: Aufforderung; Diskursmarker; pragmasemantische Analyse; Autorität.
